The Internet Never Forgets, But the Law Might: Inside the Delhi High Court’s Landmark 2026 Right to be Forgotten Verdict

Introduction

The present digital age has changed the way information is stored, used and shared. To put it differently, our life is becoming more digital. While the invention of the internet created transparency and made access to information easy, it also created some problems. The documentation is a permanent matter of the internet. This means that digital footage could continue to appear for many years. For example, if a man was wrongly accused of a crime, the news that the man was charged will always be searchable. Suppose the person was just a minor and was not to blame?  ^[1]This creates a problem and why does an individual deserve a legal right to move on from their digital past? Recently, in May 2026, the Delhi High Court acknowledged this as a right to be forgotten. It had recognized it as an integral part of the right to privacy which is enshrined in ^[2]Article 21 of the Constitution.

Understanding the Right to be Forgotten

An individual’s right to be forgotten is the right to make an application to have something removed, de-indexed, or have circulation restricted where that something is no longer necessary to be accessed by the public, no longer relevant or not proportionate. It essentially refers to a person’s immunity to digital oblivion. This idea first gained significance through the ^[3]European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 2012. This same law conferred on the individual concerned a limited right to erasure of his personal data. In India, the Right to be forgotten does not have legislative backing. The courts, however, are slowly working towards adjusting it as part of a comprehensive right to privacy of a person. The Supreme Court ruling in ^[4]Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union is what lies at the base of this effort by the Courts.

The Delhi High Court’s 2026 Judgment

The Delhi High Court Case:
In the year 2026, The ^[5]Delhi High Court, through Justice Sachin Datta, decided a bunch of writ petitions filed by persons seeking the removal or anonymisation of their personal information from online judicial databases. The petitioners included persons who were acquitted or discharged in criminal matters, parties to divorce proceedings and persons whose names were mistakenly mentioned in court records.

The Court reminded that court proceedings are public in nature but nevertheless acknowledged that the modern-day “information economy” and search engines across the globe have changed the same. Information that was previously time-consuming to locate in the court record can now be brought up instantly through a name search. The easy availability of defamatory statements greatly affects a person’s dignity, reputation and social status. ^[6]The Court mentioned that an indefinite publication online of an information is not constitutionalised by open justice when the information is not serving any lawful public purpose.

According to the ruling, the Right to be Forgotten forms part of the right to informational privacy present under ^[7]Article 21. Though, the Court mentions that this right isn’t absolute. And it will always be subjected to a balancing test against other constitutional values like freedom of speech. As well as, public interest and judicial transparency.

Framework for De-Indexing and Masking

The judgment’s principle contribution is its comprehensive framework for when de-indexing and masking may be granted. The Court identifies when relief can be granted – A finding of acquittal, discharge, quashing or closure of proceedings. Matrimony and family dispute proceedings. When the information is old, or no longer relevant. The continual public availability of similar proceedings will have a disproportionate or excessive impact on privacy, dignity and reputation. When the present public interest does not outweigh the individual interest in privacy, dignity, and reputation etc.  It also notes that relief could be refused when there continues to be a strong public interest in the matter.  When the individual is a public person and the facts are still relevant. Court cases about crimes that impact the broader community. When persisting accessibility is needed for accountability and transparency, etc. Importantly, the verdict does not allow any deletion of judicial records. The removal of the erasure of judgments cannot be ordered. It is essential that judicial data must be de-indexed and masked. Nonetheless, the meaning and purpose.

A Balanced approach between Privacy and Open Justice

A key highlight of the Judgment is how the Court attempts to strike a balance between privacy and open justice. As a rule, court proceedings occur in public in order to reduce the risk of abuse of power in secret and to enhance public confidence in the administration of justice. To put it differently, open justice acts as a powerful counter-balance to privacy rights.

But digital technology transformed public access boundaries that do not equate to permanent visibility. The Court differentiates between the two concepts of being publicly available and continuing to be searchable.  They mean that while Court records remain open to the public, automatic name based retrieval of records through search engines may strengthen the reputational harm beyond what the principle of open justice may have contemplated. The judgment notes that upholding the dignity of individuals will not be easy but without compromising on the transparency of judicial processes. The judiciary, in other words, seeks to arrive at a compromise position. This manner of thinking off the courtroom can reveal a shift. The Court did not see privacy and open justice as being in opposition to each other. On the contrary, it was.

Potential Challenges and Concerns

Even though the judgement is progressive, some challenges are thrown up by the judgement. First of all, the absence of a law on privacy will raise challenges due to possible ambiguities relating to the enforcement of the RTBF. The courts might end up judging these applications on a case-by-case basis which could lead to inconsistent decisions. Second, the opponents say this right can be used to restrict access to relevant and critical information. To some extent, de-indexing can hinder access to information which is ostensibly required to be made available for the public so that there is transparency and accountability. The implementation also becomes a problem in itself as the information to be de-indexed can be found scattered over various mediums. Also, there may be data in the search engines, social media, archives and databases for which de-indexing is being claimed. As a result, it becomes difficult to ensure compliance, which requires intermediaries’ cooperation. According to some analysts, an enlarged scope of RTBF can jeopardise people’s ^[8]right to information and freedom of speech.

The Way Forward

Delhi High Court’s judgement is a significant step towards addressing the challenges posed by digital permanence. By simultaneously granting the Right to be Forgotten constitutional validation and safeguarding open justice principles, the Court has established a substantial precedent.  This judgement will certainly be cited extensively regarding a number of privacy cases in future. However, importantly, legislative intervention may be necessary for the long-term finalisation of this matter. India’s data protection law which will likely come up with specific rules about the assessment of RTBF requests is indeed a necessity.

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s judgement of 2026 marks an important milestone in the evolution of privacy law in India. It reiterates that as a matter of constitutional power, there is no reason why a person should be shackled for life with an online reference to matters which have already been dealt with in the judicial or quasi-judicial setup. The Constitution upholds dignity, autonomy, and the self-determination of information. The judgment, on the other hand, ensures the values of transparency and accountability of the judicial process are equally respected.

References

Cases

1. Google Spain SL v. Agência Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Case C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (Ct. Just. Eur. Union May 13, 2014).
2. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
3. Jorawar Singh Mundy v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 2306.
4. Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1.
5. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
6. Subhranshu Rout @ Gugul v. State of Odisha, 2020 SCC OnLine Ori 878.
7. Vasunathan v. Registrar General, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 424.
8. Laksh Vir Singh Yadav v. Union of India & Ors., 2026:DHC:4891 (Delhi High Court May 29, 2026).

Statutes and Constitutional Provisions

1. Constitution of India arts. 19(1)(a), 21.
2. Digital Personal Data Protection Act, No. 22 of 2023, INDIA CODE (2023).
3. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.

Report

1. Committee of Experts under the Chairmanship of Justice B.N. Srikrishna, A Free and Fair Digital Economy: Protecting Privacy, Empowering Indians (2018).

Book

1. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE (Princeton Univ. Press 2009).

^[1] See generally Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age (Princeton Univ. Press 2009).

^[2] INDIA CONST. art. 21.

^[3] Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.

^[4]Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 S.C.C. 1. 

^[5] Laksh Vir Singh Yadav v. Union of India & Ors., 2026:DHC:4891 (Delhi High Court May 29, 2026).

^[6] Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1.

^[7] INDIA CONST. art. 21.

^[8] INDIA CONST. art. 19(1)(a); Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 S.C.C. 1.