Written by Aaditya Kumar Mukhija,
Intern-Lex Lumen Research Journal,
June 2025
The Supreme Court’s 2025 ruling, which reinstated the three-year practice requirement for those aspiring to the judicial service, brings up significant issues with the effectiveness of judicial training, the inclusivity of the decision-making process, and the real-world challenges faced by recent law graduates.
Inexperienced judicial officers chosen straight from law schools frequently struggle with courtroom administration and decision-making, as the ruling correctly points out. As an advocate in practice, one may see that courtroom abilities like drafting, argumentation, and procedural navigation get much better with repetition. Therefore, from a professional perspective, the Court’s concern is justified.
The effect on judicial vacancies and pendency is another important concern. There are already millions of cases languishing in India’s judiciary due to a judicial deficit. Mandating a longer practice period could make the situation worse unless hiring deadlines are closely followed and open positions are filled quickly.
The Law Commission of India’s 117th Report and the Question of Training Adequacy
The Law Commission of India stressed the importance of judicial academies and induction training programs in preparing judicial officers for the demands of court proceedings. The report made it clear that the three-year practice requirement might be reexamined with a strong and comprehensive induction training program for recent law graduates. It said:
“Those High Courts and State Governments who are interested in selecting fresh law graduates with a scheme of intensive induction training may move the Supreme Court for reconsidering the view taken in All India Judges’ Association Case for deleting the condition of three years standing as Advocate for recruitment to the cadre of Civil Judges (Junior Division). We trust and hope that the Supreme Court will reconsider that aspect.”[1]
This suggestion draws attention to a significant substitute for requiring years of litigation experience: the creation of methodical, well-thought-out training programs at judicial academies. These programs have the ability to close the knowledge gap between legal education and courtroom preparedness by offering the necessary skills in a controlled setting under the guidance of professionals.
Shetty Commission and the 3-Year Practice Requirement
The Shetty Commission, which was established to investigate the recruitment of judicial services, suggested eliminating the requirement for three years of practice experience following a thorough survey. According to the Commission, the requirement of years of prior litigation experience deters the best legal talent from entering the judiciary because some people find it unappealing after some first practice.
The Supreme Court’s reflection in the Third All India Judges Association Case encapsulated this view:
“Experience has shown that the best talent available is not attracted to the judicial service. A bright young law graduate after 3 years of practice finds the judicial service not attractive enough… It has been recommended by the Shetty Commission… that the need for an applicant to have been an advocate for at least 3 years should be done away with.” [2]
This insight is critical because it foregrounds the risk that stringent experience criteria might shrink the talent pool, contrary to the judiciary’s interest in attracting bright, capable candidates.
Were All Stakeholders Adequately Consulted?
A noteworthy criticism of the 2025 ruling is whether it sufficiently represented the opinions of all pertinent parties, particularly young advocates, law students, and members of underrepresented social groups hoping to enter the court system.
The High Courts’ and senior judges’ opinions, however authoritative, seem to have a significant impact on the Court’s mandate. However, they might not adequately represent the challenges faced by candidates from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Without concrete data or a thorough empirical analysis of how the 3-year limit affects certain demographics, the decision runs the risk of being based more on conventional ideas about advocacy experience than on a sophisticated comprehension of the reality on the ground.
According to recent criticisms, the idea of inclusivity in policy-making is compromised when young attorneys who are dealing with structural obstacles and financial instability are not given a voice. The Court itself acknowledged that the regulation might make inequality worse, but it declined to take administrative action, squandering a chance for more egalitarian judicial changes.
The Problem of Fake Certifications and Nepotism
The possibility of misuse through phony credentials is a concerning real-world effect of the three-year practice requirement, particularly in a field where personal ties are highly valued.
This ruling has, in some respects, validated nepotism. In contrast to first-generation attorneys who put in years of arduous effort and hardship, second-generation advocates only need to obtain the necessary certificate from their father or senior, frequently with little to no real experience.
Do Three Years of Practice Make Good Judges?
The ruling assumes that judges become better after three years of litigation experience. The level of experience varies greatly based on the type of practice, mentorship, and individual aptitude, even if it is undeniable that practical experience improves courtroom skills.
Furthermore, thorough judicial training in subjects like judicial ethics, case management, judgment writing, and precedent comprehension cannot be replaced by experience alone. To properly prepare new hires, the Law Commission and several legal experts have advocated for extensive induction training that lasts at least one to two years.
Just years of practice may not always equate to judicial excellence in the absence of such instruction. Strong training programs, on the other hand, may lessen the requirement for extensive practice, providing opportunities for gifted graduates to join the court early.
Critical evaluation and observations
The verdict correctly points out a real issue: inexperienced judges who are hired straight out of law school frequently struggle to manage and make decisions in the courtroom. In my experience as a practicing advocate, courtroom abilities like drafting, reasoning, and procedural navigation get much better with practice. From a professional perspective, the Court’s concern is therefore well-founded.
There are several difficulties with this mandate, though. Many young advocates, particularly those without financial security or family support, find it difficult to make ends meet in their early years of practicing litigation. Because income in these years is so unstable, talented graduates are frequently forced to look for other career choices. According to recent commentary, junior advocacy positions and internships offer exposure but frequently come with little financial security or compensation.
Inexperienced judicial officers chosen straight from law schools frequently struggle with courtroom administration and decision-making, as the ruling correctly points out. As an advocate in practice, one may see that courtroom abilities like drafting, argumentation, and procedural navigation get much better with repetition. Therefore, from a professional perspective, the Court’s concern is justified.
But there are certain difficulties with this mandate. In their early years of practicing litigation, many young advocates, particularly those without financial security or family support, find it difficult to maintain themselves. Because of the unstable nature of income during these years, gifted graduates are frequently forced to look for other professional choices. As mentioned in recent commentary, junior advocacy positions and internships offer exposure but frequently do not offer sufficient compensation or financial stability.
The effect on judicial vacancies and pendency is another important concern. There are already millions of cases languishing in India’s judiciary due to a judicial deficit. Mandating a longer practice period could make the situation worse unless hiring deadlines are closely followed and open positions are filled quickly.
Finally, issues of inequity and nepotism are brought up by the ruling. Existing socioeconomic gaps in the judiciary may be further exacerbated by the “certificate culture,” which allows applicants from well-established legal families to easily complete the three-year practice requirement while others must endure challenging and frequently unpaid years of litigation.
Recommendations and Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s ruling is both constitutionally and legally sound and emphasizes the value of real-world experience for judicial competence. To lessen its socioeconomic effects, the decision must be supported by legislative actions.
To ensure that young advocates can support themselves without experiencing excessive hardship, the government should first provide financial support mechanisms like grants or stipends for them during their practicing period.
Second, to guarantee that women, PwD applicants, and economically disadvantaged groups are not denied access to judicial service chances, recruitment regulations must allow for age relaxations and reservation allowances.
Third, judicial academies have to be improved and outfitted to provide hands-on instruction to enhance courtroom experience, assisting applicants in developing their talents prior to or concurrently with their practice period.
Fourth, to avoid backlogs brought on by postponed appointments, judge hiring should be accelerated with clear schedules.
Fifth, it would be wise to reexamine the patterns of judicial service examinations. To gauge candidates’ preparedness, the test should include demanding practical evaluations, such as case management exercises and simulated trials, rather than just requiring years of experience.
In conclusion, the three-year practice rule’s reintroduction aims to raise the caliber and efficacy of the judiciary, but it must be weighed against issues of accessibility and inclusivity. The ruling runs the risk of restricting the diversity of the judiciary and sustaining socioeconomic obstacles in the absence of such balance.
Frequenty Asked Questions(FAQs)
1.What statutory or constitutional provision governs the recruitment of judicial officers?
Article 233(2) of the Constitution of India governs recruitment to the judicial service and specifies that a person not already in the service of the Union or the State shall be eligible for appointment as a district judge only if they have been an advocate or pleader for not less than seven years. The three-year requirement for Civil Judges (Junior Division) arises from judicial interpretation, not from express statutory text.
2. What was the recommendation of the Law Commission of India on this issue?
In its 117th Report (1986), titled Training of Judicial Officers, the Law Commission recommended that the requirement of three years’ practice could be reconsidered if intensive induction training was provided to fresh law graduates.
3.What position was taken by the Shetty Commission?
The Shetty Commission recommended that the three-year experience condition should be removed, citing its deterrent effect on the entry of meritorious candidates into the judicial service.
4.Does the three-year requirement apply uniformly across all Indian States?
The requirement is applied in accordance with judicial directions and respective State Judicial Service Rules. However, following the 2025 Supreme Court ruling, its application is expected to be uniformly enforced unless legislative or judicial exceptions are made.
5. Is there a legal mechanism for High Courts or States to seek exemption from this requirement?
As per the 117th Law Commission Report, High Courts or State Governments desiring to recruit fresh graduates with intensive training may move the Supreme Court for reconsideration. No such statutory exemption exists as of now.
6. Is there any prescribed format for verifying compliance with the three-year requirement?
Verification is generally done through certificates issued by senior advocates or Bar Associations. The format and scrutiny mechanisms may vary by state, and concerns over uniform standards have been noted in various policy discussions.
References
All India Judges Association & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., Writ Petition (C) No. 1022 of 1989 (Supreme Court, 2025)
Law Commission of India, 14th Report, 1958
Shetty Commission Report, 2000
[1] Law Commission of India, 117th Report on Training of Judicial Officers (1986).
[2] All India Judges’ Association v Union of India (2002) 4 SCC 247, [32].