Illustrated by S.Sownjanya Sai
Winter Intern 2025-Lex Lumen Research Journal
CASE BRIEF:
Introduction
The Supreme Court’s Decision in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India will be viewed as one of the foundational determinations in determining whether the Internet has changed the communication landscape for people. The court’s decision rejected the notion that the internet was a location where the Constitution could not be relied upon to protect the right to free speech. In its ruling, the court captured the notion that both online and offline free speech must be treated the same as does the constitution with respect to limits on free speech. The court’s ruling limited both the use of generality or imprecision of the law to resolve differences of opinion. Additionally, the court limited excessive and arbitrary use of the criminal or civil justice systems to resolve issues related to use of expressions of free speech. The ruling also reaffirmed the necessity of upholding the rule of law through ensuring that laws are clear, concise, and that they provide proportionality and fairness for all citizens under Article 19(1)(a).
Facts of the Case
The Information Technology Act of 2000’s section 66A outlined a penalty for electronic messages sent that were “grossly offensive,” “annoying,” or “causing an inconvenience” or that had a “menacing nature.” The law was heavily scrutinised as many people were arrested for what was, in fact, an innocuous electronic message. One noteworthy case involved two young women being arrested in Maharashtra after posting a comment on their Facebook page relating to a political shutdown.
After witnessing the continuous misuse of section 66A and its negative impact on free speech through electronic means, Shreya Singhal (a law student), filed a writ petition under article 32 of the Indian constitution claiming that the section was unconstitutional and further questioning the legality of section 69A of the Information Technology Act, which allows the government to block material being disseminated over the internet and the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011.
Issues for Determination
1. Whether Section 66A violated the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).
2. Whether the restrictions imposed by Section 66A were saved by Article 19(2).
3. Whether Section 66A was void for vagueness and arbitrariness.
4. Whether Section 69A and the Intermediary Guidelines Rules were constitutionally valid.
Judgement and Reasoning
In the ruling by Justice Rohinton F. Nariman, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that Section 66A was unconstitutional and confirmed that while Section 69A was unconstitutional, because there were proper procedural safeguards in place, or the guidelines regarding intermediaries were constitutional as applied to them.
The Court based its decision on the following four principles:
Vague and Arbitrary Enforceability
The Court found that words including “annoy,” “harass,” and “grossly offend,” are all vague, subjective terms that do not define an act. Such vagueness creates an undue amount of discretion in the hands of the law enforcement agencies, and as a result, this provision is unconstitutional due to the lack of legal certainty it provides.
Chilling Effects of Free Speech
The Court recognized the chilling effect doctrine, which states that because of the vagueness of a criminal statute, people will refrain from exercising their rights to free expression, due to the fear of criminal prosecution.
Limits to Article 19(2) were set by Incitement Standards
The Court expressly stated that the only restrictions on free speech are those which have a direct and proximate nexus to one of the underlying basis for restricting free speech as enumerated in Article 19(2). Distinguishing between discussion, advocacy and incitement, the Court held that the only speech which could be reasonably restricted is that which rises to the level of inciting violence or public disorder.
Constitutional Safeguards for Electronic Expression
The Court’s holding confirms that the same level of constitutional protection should apply to electronic communication as would apply to non-electronic communication. The Court has stated that the manner in which an individual communicates (i.e. through the use of the internet or through traditional means) does not determine the amount of constitutional protections for that individual’s speech.
Conclusion
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India expresses emphatically the conclusion reached in this case that there can be no viable democracy if there is a vague criminal prohibition against free expression by individuals. In striking down the provisions of Section 66A of the Act, the Supreme Court of India returned the constitutional balance between state authority and individual liberty, meaning that the internet would continue to be used as a medium for free, vigorous, and unfettered expression. The Court’s holding continues to serve as a reminder that fears has no place in a constitutional system of government based on the rule of law.
