Written by Tanya kumari,
Lex Lumen Research Journal Summer Intern,
June 2026
When Constitutional Morality Challenges Social Conformity
“The legitimacy of love in a constitutional democracy cannot be determined solely by social approval.”
Introduction
Whereas, two adults who consent to reside together without getting married have their autonomy respected by law, the social reaction to such living arrangements has often been hostile instead of welcoming. Indeed, this is what makes the topic so pertinent when talking about India’s constitutional democracy because there is an ever-present tension between the individual rights enshrined in the constitution and the traditional beliefs. The issue of cohabitation is a very complex one since it represents the struggle between the constitutional values and the society’s expectations from its citizens.
Throughout the centuries, marriage has been considered an elevated and respectable institution that provided not only legal grounds for cohabitation but also social approval of the relationship. In other words, people who were not married did not have any rights that would be recognized by the society, which means that such relationships have always been scrutinized in terms of morality rather than law. Contemporary India has seen significant change in recent years due to urbanization, economic freedom, higher levels of education, etc.
Therefore, the topic of live-in relationships becomes a constitutional issue in terms of the question of whether individual liberty can prosper when subjected to social judgment.
Constitutionalization of the Right to Choose
Despite the lack of explicit provision in the Indian Constitution regarding live-in relationships, the transformative nature of the Constitution ensures a strong basis for safeguarding them. It is not merely an instrument of regulating institutions but also acts as a charter to protect individual dignity from majoritarian pressures.
Article 21[1] of the Constitution guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, but through judicial interpretation, it has been transformed to ensure substantive rights such as privacy, autonomy, dignity, and decisional independence. The recognition of the right to privacy as fundamental in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India [2]marked a transformation in the constitutional doctrine on intimate relationships. The Supreme Court ruled that decisions about companionship and personal relationships fall under the ambit of individual liberty and cannot be forced upon individuals by either the State or social morality.
The Constitution further supports the protection of live-in relationships through Articles 14 [3]and 19,[4] which ensure equality before the law and freedom to make independent decisions about life, respectively. Collectively, these articles ensure that individuals have the freedom to define their relationship without institutional endorsement.
Constitutional Morality Over Social Morality
The constitutional acceptability of live-in relationships can only be comprehended through the lens of constitutional morality.
According to Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, constitutional morality was an ethical duty that curbed social majoritarianism and ensured that individual rights were not violated by majoritarian cultural values.[5] It was not merely following traditional values but adhering to the constitutional ethos of liberty, equality, dignity, and fraternity.
Live-in relationships are an example of the kind of individual choices made by people that are put to test through constitutional morality. Social morality may measure legitimacy based on marriage while the State cannot compel how individuals build their personal lives.
The Supreme Court has always reinforced this idea. In Lata Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh,[6] the Court held that adult individuals have the right to choose who to partner with. In S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal,[7] it was reiterated that live-in relationships are not illegal and cannot be criminalized based on moral objections.
Such judicial pronouncements denote the constitutional transition of protection from institutions to individuals.
Judicial Gains and Legislative Silence
While judicial pronouncements have been progressive, the law pertaining to live-in relationships in India still continues to be piecemeal and largely governed by judicial construction.
The landmark judgment in the case of Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma[8] constituted a significant milestone as it included the relationship “in the nature of marriage” within the ambit of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.[9] The Court recognized the changing times and need for appropriate legislation, providing guidelines to decide such cases.
Yet, judicial creativity cannot serve as a substitute for legislative action. Issues related to alimony, succession, inheritance, liability, and dissolution of such relationships continue to be decided in a piecemeal manner, thereby leaving scope for uncertainty in the lives of persons desirous of securing their rights outside of marriage.
Rights based on judicial constructions can be at risk of being inconsistent and inaccessible. Legislation is therefore indispensable for the realization of constitutional rights in concrete form.
Gender, Equality and The Hidden Weight
Live-in relationships become an equal discussion about gender justice, despite the fact that constitutional rights apply to everyone. The negative effects on one’s choice of entering into a live-in relationship affect women predominantly.
It becomes difficult for many women to escape being maligned for their actions, socially ostracized from their family, deprived of their own accommodation, or facing economic instability upon ending such a union. Women’s independence has been measured through ideas of respectability based on married life.
The protection offered to women by judicial interpretation of statutes under the Domestic Violence Act is a big step in recognizing this vulnerability. Yet, true equality goes further in ensuring that women’s rights and social security are clear under the law.
For a democracy practicing substantive equality, women cannot have their dignity contingent on their marriage certificate.
Lessons from Comparison
Various countries have reacted to changes in the structure of families by providing an integrated legal system for cohabitation. Examples include France, which has accepted civil unions, and Australia, which recognizes rights of de facto couples with regard to maintenance and property division similar to that granted to married persons after living together for certain specified periods. On the other hand, India continues to depend mostly on judicial construction. Although this approach has helped enhance constitutional guarantees, it has been reactive rather than systematic.
Recognition over Tolerance
Constitutional debate around live-in relationships needs to transcend the stage of tolerance and reach the level of recognition. What is at stake is not the social importance of marriage but rather the recognition that other types of companionate relations are equally important within the constitution.
Recognition of live-in relationships will not undermine marriage in any way; rather, it will reinforce constitutional democracy by making it clear that individuals enjoy dignity and freedom, no matter what their marital status. Live-in relationships must cease being regarded as an exception and be seen as a proper manifestation of individual rights.
Conclusion
The issue of live-in relationships boils down to the essence of freedom within a constitutional democracy. Where freedom depends on social approbation, it is not really freedom guaranteed by the constitution but a concession made by the majority. As the Constitutional law of India has always maintained, what makes intimate relations legitimate is the fact that such relations are based on consent and dignity as opposed to ritual and tradition. However, the existence of social discrimination indicates that while constitutional progress is being made, society is lagging behind.
The Constitution was not meant for the protection of social uniformity but for securing the freedom of the individual. For constitutional morality to have any practical bearing, it would have to ensure the same level of dignity for relationships entered into through consent as it does for those sanctioned by tradition. In other words, what matters now is not whether live-in relationships are worthy of constitutional recognition—this question has been settled by the courts—but whether Indian society accepts that the legitimacy of love cannot be determined simply through marriage.
References
[1] INDIA CONST. art. 21.
[2] Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
[3] INDIA CONST. art. 14.
[4] INDIA CONST. art. 19.
[5] B.R. Ambedkar, Annihilation of Caste (Navayana Publishing Pvt. Ltd. 2014)
[6] Lata Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2006) 5 SCC 475.
[7] S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600.
[8]Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755
[9] The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, § 2(f), India Code (2005).