A DEEP DIVE INTO THE SHANTI BILL’S DNA

Introduction:

The SHANTI Bill, 2025 (Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for  Transforming India), is being presented as a “modernisation moment” for India’s nuclear future:  bigger capacity, cleaner energy, more innovation, and, crucially, a wider role for private  companies.1 

But to really understand what SHANTI means, we need to look beyond the slogans and press  statements. The real story lies in the Bill’s DNA: the basic assumptions it makes about risk,  responsibility, and time.2 Because nuclear energy is not like other sectors. And if a law treats it  like one, the problems won’t show up immediately; they’ll show up decades later.3 

1. SHANTI as a “Scale” Law, Not Just a “Safety” Law 

SHANTI repeatedly links nuclear expansion to big national goals—clean energy security, round the-clock electricity, advanced scientific applications, and even powering future-ready  infrastructure like data centres and AI-driven technologies.4 

The political economy behind this is fairly simple.  

• India wants reliable non-fossil baseload power.5 

• Renewables are growing, but storage and grid-balancing are still a challenge.6 

• Nuclear is being positioned as the “always-on clean backbone.”7 

So, SHANTI’s primary purpose is not merely to update rules. It’s to unlock speed and capital so  that nuclear capacity can grow rapidly from its current levels to ambitious targets like 100 GW by  2047.8 

2. Why Nuclear Risk Doesn’t Fit the Usual “Business Law” Model 

Most economic law quietly assumes that actors are temporary: 

• Companies form, merge, and dissolve.  

• Contracts begin and end. 

• Insurers arrive and depart.9 

Nuclear risk laughs at those assumptions. 

Radiation exposure, environmental contamination, waste management, and plant  decommissioning do not follow corporate cycles. Their effects can unfold slowly, over decades &  generations.10 That’s why many countries treat nuclear as a special legal category. It’s an industry  where the risk tail is longer than the lifespan of most institutions.11 

This mismatch between short-lived economic actors and long-lasting nuclear harm is the core  tension the SHANTI Bill must address.12 

3. Private Entry and the Governance Dilemma 

SHANTI expands who can be licensed. Earlier, many “specified activities” were restricted mainly  to government entities. Now the Bill allows licences for key activities (like building/owning/operating nuclear plants and fabrication/transport/storage of nuclear fuel) to be  granted to: 

• Indian companies (excluding companies incorporated outside India), 

• certain joint ventures, 

• and other persons expressly permitted by the government.13 

It still keeps the state central in strategic oversight, but this is undeniably a structural opening. 

Why open it? Because scaling nuclear is expensive and slow. Private participation is expected to  bring: 

• capital, 

• project management capacity, 

• manufacturing ecosystems, 

• and potentially faster execution.14 

But this creates a deep governance puzzle: 

If nuclear harm can manifest long after profits are booked, how does the law ensure that  responsibility endures corporate mortality? 

A licence, after all, is only a permission to operate. It doesn’t automatically create decades-long accountability.15 

4. Liability Design and Investment De-Risking 

A) Total cap per incident (the outer boundary) 

The Bill sets the maximum liability per nuclear incident at the rupee equivalent of 300 million  Special Drawing Rights (SDR) (unless the government notifies a higher amount).16 It also references the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage  (CSC) as a possible route for additional funds when compensation exceeds the cap. 17 

B) Graded operator liability (inner boundary) 

Within this overall cap, the Bill introduces a graded system of operator liability instead of one  uniform figure. The amount an operator must pay depends on the size and category of the reactor  involved. The Bill’s schedule lists (in INR crore): 

• 3000 for reactors above 3600 MW (th), 

• 1500 for 1500–3600 MW (th), 

• 750 for 750–1500 MW (th), 

• 300 for 150–750 MW (th), 

• 100 for up to 150 MW (th) and certain fuel-cycle/transport categories.18 

This is one of SHANTI’s “investment-friendly” features, as it makes liability more predictable for  operators and insurers.19 

C) The state as the backstop 

If liability exceeds the operator’s cap, the Central Government becomes liable to the extent of  the excess in specified situations, and can create a Nuclear Liability Fund to meet that  responsibility.20 

This arrangement is not unusual. Many countries channel liability to operators while providing  state-backed layers of support.21 The real issue, however, is not whether the state acts as a backstop.  The key issue is how the Bill prevents risk being casually dumped onto the state as a default  outcome.22 

5. Supplier Accountability 

Under SHANTI, the operator’s right of recourse after paying compensation exists only when: 

• it is expressly written in a contract, or 

• The incident was caused by intentional acts to cause nuclear damage.23 

This matters because supplier liability has long been a contentious issue in India’s nuclear  framework. By shifting recourse largely into the realm of private contracts, SHANTI reduces legal  uncertainty for vendors again, potentially boosting investment interest.24 

But here’s the trade-off: 

• Contracts are negotiated by powerful parties, often behind closed doors.25 • Safety incentives weaken if supplier consequences become negotiable rather than structural. • After an accident, victims don’t care what was in a contract—they care who pays and how  fast.26 

If supplier accountability becomes mostly contractual, the public interest depends heavily on how  well the state regulates procurement quality, audits designs, and enforces safety standards  upfront.27 

6. “Justice Architecture” and Time Limits 

SHANTI attempts to streamline how victims of nuclear incidents seek compensation by creating  a dedicated Claims Commissioner and Claims Commission system. Claims need to be filed  within three years from the date of knowledge of nuclear damage.28 

But it also extinguishes the right to claim if not made within: 

• 10 years for property damage, 

• 20 years for personal injury, from the date of notification of the incident.29 

These timelines are not random; they’re meant to create legal closure.30 Yet they create a serious  policy question: 

What if radiation-linked illnesses manifest or are diagnosed beyond the window, especially  in communities with weak health surveillance?31 

A claims system may look efficient on paper, but its fairness ultimately depends on the state’s  capacity to track health outcomes over time, fund long-term epidemiological studies, and  proactively inform affected populations.32 

7. Regulation and Real Independence 

SHANTI gives the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) a statutory basis under the new  Act.33 This is a meaningful institutional move. But we should remember: independence isn’t  created by one word (“statutory”). Real independence comes from: 

• appointment processes, 

• budgets and staffing, 

• transparency obligations, 

• enforcement culture, 

• and political insulation.34

If private participation expands, the regulator must scale even faster than the industry otherwise  the system becomes “growth first, oversight later.”35 

8. Federalism and State Governments 

Nuclear installations (may be licensed by the Union government) are physically located in states,  but: 

• Law-making is Union-controlled36 

• Liability, policing, health systems, disaster response fall heavily on states37 This creates a subtle but important federal imbalance as these remain unaddressed: 

• How SHANTI centralises decision-making while states bear long-term social costs38 • What role (if any) states have in licensing, emergency preparedness, or consent39 

This matters politically and constitutionally.40 

9. Intergenerational Ethics 

Questions like: 

• Can one generation legally consent to risks borne by unborn citizens? • Does SHANTI provide institutional voice to future stakeholders?41  are still to be addressed. 

Nuclear risks do not end with the operational life of a plant. Radioactive waste, contaminated  ecosystems, and latent health effects may affect people who were not alive when the original  approvals were granted.42 These future citizens have no voice in today’s cost–benefit  calculations.43 

While SHANTI acknowledges responsibility through liability limits and compensation  mechanisms, it does not create institutions that actively represent future interests—such as  permanent monitoring funds, long-term health studies, or safeguards designed to survive  political changes and corporate restructuring.44 

10. The Deepest Structural Mismatch  

Here’s the uncomfortable truth: even with caps, funds, and regulation, nuclear governance has a  unique mismatch: 

• Private actors are structurally short-term (companies can dissolve; incentives are profit based).45 

• Nuclear harms are structurally long-term (waste, exposure, contamination,  decommissioning).46 

SHANTI recognises the urgency of expanding nuclear capacity and builds a framework to enable  it.47But it leaves a gap: it doesn’t clearly build a “continuity of responsibility” bridge that survives  corporate death. If India is serious about private entry, it will need extra guardrails beyond what SHANTI alone  guarantees, such as: 

• mandatory ring-fenced decommissioning escrow funds that cannot be repurposed, • parent-company guarantees that survive restructuring, 

• long-tail insurance arrangements with state-backed reinsurance, 

• public disclosure of safety audits and incident reporting, 

• and strict rules on transfer/sale of nuclear assets (so liability can’t be “sold away”).48 

Without these, the logic will quietly become: “profits are private in the short term;  responsibility becomes public in the long term.”49 

11. Conclusion: SHANTI Is a Growth Engine—Now India Must Build the Brakes and  Seatbelts 

The SHANTI Bill is a landmark because it changes the direction of India’s nuclear governance:  from a largely state-centred model to a controlled opening designed to hit a massive scale target.50 

It creates predictable liability boundaries, clarifies state backstop liability, formalises the regulator,  and builds a claims pathway.51 

But the bill’s DNA still carries a risk: it treats nuclear expansion partly like an investment problem,  when it is also a civilisation-length responsibility problem.52 

If SHANTI is the engine for nuclear scale-up, India now needs the equally serious work of  designing: 

• continuity mechanisms, 

• long-horizon accountability, 

• and public-trust institutions.53 

Because with nuclear, the toughest exam question is never “how do we build it?” It’s “how do we stay responsible for it—when today’s decision-makers are long gone?”54

1 Government of India, The SHANTI Bill, 2025, Statement of Objects and Reasons; see also Department of Atomic  Energy, Government of India, official briefing on proposed reforms in India’s civil nuclear framework (2024–25).

2 OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Risk Governance: Insights from Past Accidents (OECD Publishing);  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF 1.

3 World Health Organization, Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health Care Programmes; United  Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), Sources and Effects of Ionizing  Radiation (multiple assessment reports).

4 Government of India, The SHANTI Bill, 2025, Statement of Objects and Reasons; Department of Atomic Energy,  Government of India, official background note on the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy  for Transforming India Bill. 

5 NITI Aayog, India Energy Security Scenarios 2047; Government of India, Nationally Determined Contribution  (Updated), 2022. 

6 Central Electricity Authority, National Electricity Plan (Transmission); International Energy Agency (IEA), India Energy Outlook (latest edition), sections on grid integration and storage challenges.

7International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Nuclear Power and Sustainable Development; World Nuclear  Association, The Role of Nuclear Energy in Low-Carbon Power Systems. 

8 Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, public statements and planning documents outlining long-term  nuclear capacity targets up to 2047; Parliamentary responses on India’s nuclear expansion roadmap.

9 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (Pearson Education), chapters on corporate personality,  contract duration, and liability allocation in commercial law. 

10 United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), Sources and Effects of  Ionizing Radiation; World Health Organization, Ionizing Radiation, Health Effects and Protective Measures. 11 OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Law Bulletin; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Handbook on  Nuclear Law, particularly chapters on special liability regimes. 

12 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage: International Legal Framework;  European Commission, Nuclear Safety and Liability Frameworks in Comparative Perspective.

13 Government of India, The SHANTI Bill, 2025, provisions relating to licensing of “specified activities”; Department  of Atomic Energy, Government of India, explanatory notes on proposed changes to participation in the civil nuclear  sector. 

14 World Nuclear Association, The Economics of Nuclear Power; International Energy Agency (IEA), Nuclear Power  and Energy Security; NITI Aayog, India Energy Security Scenarios 2047. 

15 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Handbook on Nuclear Law; OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Liability  and Compensation for Nuclear Damage, discussions on long-term risk and operator responsibility. 16 Government of India, The SHANTI Bill, 2025, provisions relating to maximum liability per nuclear incident;  Statement of Objects and Reasons.

17 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage;  Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, notification regarding India’s accession to the CSC.

18 Government of India, The SHANTI Bill, 2025, Schedule on operator liability limits for different reactor categories.

19 OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Liability: Financial Security and Insurance Aspects; World Nuclear  Association, Nuclear Insurance and Liability. 

20 Government of India, The SHANTI Bill, 2025, clauses relating to Central Government liability and establishment of  a Nuclear Liability Fund. 

21 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Handbook on Nuclear Law, chapters on channelling of liability and  state supplementary compensation; OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, International Nuclear Liability Regimes.

22 OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Liability and Compensation for Nuclear Damage: An International Overview;  European Commission, Comparative Analysis of Nuclear Liability Systems.

23 Government of India, The SHANTI Bill, 2025, provisions relating to operator’s right of recourse against suppliers;  comparison with Section 17 of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010. 

24 OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Liability and Supplier Involvement; World Nuclear Association, Supplier  Liability and Nuclear Investment Risk. 

25 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Handbook on Nuclear Law, discussion on contractual allocation of  risk and supplier responsibility. 

26 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report on the Human Rights Implications of Nuclear Accidents; World  Health Organization, Public Health Response to Nuclear Emergencies. 

27 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Safety Standards Series; OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Regulatory  Oversight of Nuclear Supply Chains. 

28 Government of India, The SHANTI Bill, 2025, provisions relating to the Claims Commissioner and time limits for  filing compensation claims. 

29 Government of India, The SHANTI Bill, 2025, clauses specifying extinction of claims after prescribed time periods  for property damage and personal injury. 

30 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Handbook on Nuclear Law, chapters on limitation periods and legal  finality in nuclear liability regimes. 

31 United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), Sources and Effects of  Ionizing Radiation; World Health Organization, Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation. 

32 World Health Organization, Public Health Response to Nuclear Accidents; International Commission on  Radiological Protection (ICRP), Recommendations on Radiological Protection and Long-Term Health Monitoring.

33 Government of India, The SHANTI Bill, 2025, provisions establishing the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board as a  statutory authority. 

34 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Being an Independent Regulator: The  Governance of Regulators; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Regulatory Independence in Nuclear Safety  Frameworks.

35 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems; OECD Nuclear Energy  Agency, Regulatory Oversight and Institutional Capacity in Nuclear Safety. 

36 Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, Union List, Entry 6 (Atomic energy and mineral resources necessary for  its production). 

37 Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, State List, Entries relating to public health, police, public order, and local  governance; Disaster Management Act, 2005. 

38 Government of India, The SHANTI Bill, 2025, provisions centralising licensing and regulatory authority;  comparative reading with principles of cooperative federalism articulated by the Supreme Court of India.

39 Government of India, The SHANTI Bill, 2025, absence of explicit provisions detailing state participation in licensing  or consent processes. 

40 Supreme Court of India, State of Rajasthan v. Union of India; S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (principles of federalism  and constitutional balance); NITI Aayog, Cooperative Federalism in India. 

41 Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and  Intergenerational Equity (United Nations University); UNESCO, Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present  Generations Towards Future Generations (1997).

42 United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), Sources and Effects of  Ionizing Radiation; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Radioactive Waste Management and Disposal.

43 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Brundtland Report); OECD,  Governance for Future Generations. 

44 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Long-Term Stewardship of Radioactive Waste; OECD Nuclear Energy  Agency, Decommissioning Funding and Long-Term Liabilities. 

45 OECD, Corporate Governance and Risk Management; Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave & Martin Lodge,  Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice (Oxford University Press). 

46 United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), Sources and Effects of  Ionizing Radiation; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Radioactive Waste Management and  Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities. 

47 Government of India, The SHANTI Bill, 2025, Statement of Objects and Reasons; Department of Atomic Energy,  Government of India, long-term nuclear capacity planning documents.

48 OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Decommissioning Funding: Assurance and Long-Term Liability; International  Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Financial Assurance for Nuclear Decommissioning; World Nuclear Association,  Nuclear Insurance and Liability. 

49 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity; OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Liability and Compensation  for Nuclear Damage: An International Overview. 

50 Government of India, The SHANTI Bill, 2025, Statement of Objects and Reasons; Department of Atomic Energy,  Government of India, policy documents on reforming India’s civil nuclear framework. 

51 Government of India, The SHANTI Bill, 2025, provisions relating to liability caps, Central Government liability,  statutory status of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, and claims mechanisms. 

52 OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Law and Long-Term Risk Governance; Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards  a New Modernity (discussion on long-duration technological risks).

54 Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations; UNESCO, Declaration on the Responsibilities of the  Present Generations Towards Future Generations.