Written by Shubham Shrivastva & Manvi Kumari,
student at Dharmashahstra National Law University,
December 2025
Imagine you are a journalist who has endured a film so lacklustre that it warrants a candid critique, yet you feel restrained by the nuances of personality. This privilege often protects stars from criticism and fosters respect for their personal dignity. This is what is happening these days, where many actors are trying to get their personalities right to shield themselves from criticism. Recently, in mid-October, the Delhi High Court granted Hrithik Roshan a significant victory by ordering the protection of his personality rights against unauthorised commercial use, including AI images, deepfake videos, fake modulation of his voice and restraining any parties from using his name and other belongings. Moreover, this is not just the only case in the year 2025 many celebrities are trying to get their personality right few of the cases including daler mehndi want to protect toy shops from making dolls that look like him, Abhisek Bachchan does not want anyone to interfere with his right to livelihood by selling t shirt with his name and face and anil Kapoor is annoyed with people using the cat phrase ‘jhaakas’ and the list goes on. These growing claims of personality rights have garnered significant attention in the media and raised a serious question about whether personality rights can be exercised in a way that overrides the constitutional right to freedom of speech.
THE DEVELOPING LAW OF PERSONALITY RIGHTS: A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
The right to publicity, or ‘personality right,’ is the legal protection of one’s image, name, or likeness from unauthorised use, originating from the 1905 case of Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance, and now central to constitutional debates in India. The concept was introduced and later discussed in the case of Healan Laboratories Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum Inc. However, in Indian jurisprudence, publicity rights are generally associated with the right to privacy, as the Delhi High Court held in 2003. Although principles were already established in 1994 in the case of R. Rajagopal vs State of Tamilnadu. Nevertheless, in this case, it expressly dealt with publicity rights as a facet of the right to privacy, clearly asserting that this right evolved from the right of privacy. A violation of this would be clearly considered a violation of Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution, citing the reason that no person can be monopolised. Although the Constitution does not explicitly refer to personality rights, the judiciary has gradually come to regard them as part of the overall guarantees of Article 21. This has emerged as a result of the realisation that personal liberty cannot be merely restricted to physical security nowadays. However, it should also encompass the fact that one can regulate how they represent, consume, or abuse identity, whether in the real world or the virtual world.
This interpretation of Article 21, as applied by the Supreme Court, has evolved over the years to include the rights to dignity, autonomy, reputation, and privacy as key elements of a meaningful life. It would also extend to apply to personality rights, which include a person’s name, image, likeness, and voice, all of which concern their autonomy and dignity. The case of Puttaswamy was the beginning, as it acknowledged the constitutional interest of an individual in protecting their identity and personal information. Nowadays, with deepfakes, AI-created faces, voice cloning, and commercial abuse, courts are starting to recognise that the abuse of the persona of an individual has a direct impact on their dignity and autonomy.
Consequently, the personality rights are taking on a quasi-fundamental nature. Injunctions are regularly granted in the courts, particularly when there is a commercial benefit or a misrepresentation, and these are seen as a significant threat to the infringement of individual freedom. Nevertheless, this broadening protection also raises constitutional issues. The rights of personality, given too broad a connotation, can be used as an instrument to dodge criticism, parody, comment, or an artistic performance, precisely the core of Article 19(1)(a). As a means to resolve this tension, courts have been increasingly using proportionality as a guiding principle. Whether the protection of identity should be provided, but is the restriction of speech required, particular, and contained in a logical decision? It is a doctrine of development, suggesting a prudent constitutional concession, that recognises the necessity of protecting dignity and autonomy. Nonetheless, personality rights must not be transformed into censorship by the back door. The judiciary faces the challenge of maintaining this balance without eroding either of the two values.
PERSONALITY RIGHTS VS. FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A CONSTITUTIONAL TUG-OF-WAR
Article 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution grant the freedom of speech and the right to life and personal liberty, respectively. The personal dignity and privacy, which courts have termed part of “personality,” have been recognised as part of Article 21. However, they have also guaranteed a vibrant press and the freedom of expression in art under Article 19. For example, in R. Rajagopal v. The Supreme Court of the State of Tamil Nadu (1994), the court recognised a right to privacy under Article 21 but found that this right must be weighed against press freedom; press freedom is not absolute and must be balanced against the right to privacy. Likewise, in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), a nine-judge judiciary unanimously recognised privacy as a fundamental right, which is one of the core values of human dignity, personal autonomy and freedom. Practically, these decisions imply that people have the opportunity to regulate the use of their name, image, and personal information, but within the boundaries that do not interfere with free speech.
Although such cases offer people security against exploitation, critics are wary of the judiciary exercising too much power. There is no explicit law of personality rights in India, and in some instances, courts have issued ex parte injunctions without adequately considering the values enshrined in Article 19. In D.M. Entertainment v. Baby Gift House, the Delhi High Court warned Baby Gift House (2010) that excessive emphasis on the publicity rights may tend to stifle free speech and render a complete genre of expression inaccessible. Likewise, according to commentators, frivolous lawsuits may discourage parodies, journalism or popular comment on personalities. This frailty is highlighted by a survey from 2025: 89 per cent of Indians indicate that people should be allowed to speak freely without censorship; however, the support for controversial content decreases to an abysmally low 37 per cent, allowing insults to the national flag. Simultaneously, India scores very low on freedom of the press (159th of 180 countries in 2024), which means that additional speech restrictions might create an additional burden on an already tense media environment.
The conflict between articles 19 and 21 is factual and developing. Protection of personal dignity is laudable, and care should be taken by the courts not to allow an unspecified right to personality to turn into a general censorship device. Injunctions protecting celebrity fame will, in many cases, as one analysis cautions, avoid a complete assessment of free speech. Judges in a democratic system are expected to insist on explicit criteria – perhaps new laws – in order to restrict expression in the interest of personality. Otherwise, the tendency to expand personality rights very loosely threatens to undermine the very freedom of speech, on which all other rights are based.
CONCLUSION
In the era of digital exploitation, the concept of personality rights must be developed in India to ensure the autonomy of human beings. However, when not used in a proper balance, it may also jeopardise the freedom of speech and turn into a tool of censorship, suppressing any valid criticism. The courts must insist on understanding and observing standards that ensure the identity protection of any user does not hinder criticism, press freedom, or artistic expression.
REFERENCES: ( Attached in context)
