The Pocket Veto Paradox: Weaponizing Article 200 Against State Autonomy

ABSTRACT

The notion of a pocket veto, when a constitutional head virtually kills a bill by refusing to do so, is not new to comparative legislative procedures, especially on the national scale. The Indian Constitution, under Article 200, allows a state Governor, when a state legislature passes a bill, three express choices, including: assent, without assent (return the bill to the legislature), or retain the bill to the consideration of the President. The Constitution however does not stipulate a time limit thus leaving a possible loophole where Governors may delay indefinitely and thus obstruct legislative intent effectively implementing what has been characterized as a pocket veto. This move has huge consequences in the state autonomy and federalism because the inaction of a Governor over a long period of time can hinder the legislative will of an already elected state government and transform the position of the Governor into a de facto power centre. In a recent case, the Supreme Court of India made it clear that such non-action is unconstitutional: the meaning of as soon as possible in Article 200 is an obligatory requirement to act, and a failure to take one of the three courses of action stipulated is equivalent to the legal impediment to the legislative process.