Executive Overreach and the Erosion of Judicial Autonomy

ABSTRACT

Separation of powers and independence of judiciary have been the fundamental principles of India’s constitutional democracy, as these two concepts guarantee that power in India is controlled by constitution and law. The paper attempts to analyse the changing dynamics between the executive and the judiciary in India, especially the growing number of cases of executive overreach that jeopardize the independence and accountability of judiciary. Erosion of the independence of judiciary is not only limited to direct intervention but also includes legislative actions, executive actions, and delays in constitutional processes.

This paper conducts an analysis and review of important constitutional developments by heavily relying on the recent rulings of the Supreme Court of India such as Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra, Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India, State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab, State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, and In re Directions in the Matter of Demolition of Structures. These rulings are analysed along with pertinent constitutional provisions and the Constituent Assembly Debates along with classic constitutional theory by B.R. Ambedkar, A.V. Dicey, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Aristotle, and M.P. Jain.

Moreover, the article examines the main points made in support of increasing executive discretion. These include points based on the principle of democracy, efficiency in administration, and accountability to the people. The article critically analyzes the aforementioned points by comparing them with the constitutional principles of limited government and judicial review among others.

The conclusion drawn from the article is that the safeguarding of judicial independence entails more than the decisions of the judiciary. The maintenance of judicial independence requires the need for institutional vigilance, legislative responsibility, and the application of constitutional morality. The article suggests the reinforcement of procedures for the appointment process, curtailment of discretionary power by the executive branch in matters relating to the office of the constitution, timely fulfilment of constitutional responsibilities, and institutional safeguards that guarantee the existence of the separation of powers.