- LLRJ | Lex Lumen Research Journal
- 2024
Electoral Bonds and Transparency In Political Fundings: A Critical Analysis
Author: Bhoomika Singh, Student, Atal Bihari Vajpayee School of Legal Studies, Chhatrapati Shahu Ji Maharaj University, Kanpur [Pages:252-282]
KEYWORDS: Corporate donations, Electoral bonds, Regulatory capture, Political coercion, Institutional trust.
ABSTRACT
In this particular article, an attempt is being made to study the impact of the donations received by political parties from the corporate sector in India. This is particularly focused on studying their impact with the help of electoral bonds. In this context, there are various questions that need to be answered. Why do the corporate houses make political contributions? Is it because they believe in the political philosophy for which the party stands, or is there something else for which such donations have been made? There is also one very important question that emerges here. Is it possible to conduct an election campaign without the use of corporate donations? However, this dependency poses a certain problem, as the influence of corporate interests over public policy could become predominant over people’s welfare. While it is true that this scheme regulates donation in a more transparent way via banking channels, this comes at the cost of not making known the identity of donors. Such a move has implications on transparency, an important issue when one considers that the identity of people who fund political parties should not remain unknown. The other interesting point raised in the article has to do with whether the scheme is still redeemable in light of the decision rendered in the case of Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution–NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) licence, which permits remixing, adapting, and building upon the work for non-commercial use, provided the original work is properly cited.
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