Constitutional Amendments, Judicial Review, And The Limits Of Parliamentary Power: The Basic Structure Doctrine, Simultaneous Elections, And Women’s Reservation In Contemporary India

The mutual interacts of constitutional amendments and judicial review constitute one of the most debated as well as the most vigorously thought-provoking landscapes of Indian constitutional jurisprudence. Article 368 of the Constitution of India gives the Parliament the right to make amends to any provision of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the basic question that has continued to arouse constitutional debate is whether this power of amendment is absolute or subject to judicially cognizable restraints. The paper gives a critical analysis of the history of judicial review of constitutional amendments in India, developing the doctrinal narrative of the early deferential approach, found in Shankari Prasad v. Union of India to the groundbreaking formulation of the Basic Structure Doctrine, in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala. It also examines later cases that contributed to the development and implementation of this doctrine such as Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain and I.R.of Tamil Nadu. The paper has critically assessed the theoretical basis of the Basic Structure Doctrine, reasons behind its normativeness, and conflicts with the democratic idea of parliamentary sovereignty. Based on the comparative constitutional law and the mainstream scholarly beliefs, the paper maintains that although it is judicially creative and institutionally self-serving in certain aspects, the doctrine is an invaluable guarantee against constitutional authoritarianism. The paper finally gives the recommendations regarding a more orderly and open constitutional dialogue between the Parliament and the Supreme Court Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu. The paper has critically assessed the theoretical basis of the Basic Structure Doctrine, reasons behind its normativeness, and conflicts with the democratic idea of parliamentary sovereignty. Based on the comparative constitutional law and the mainstream scholarly beliefs, the paper maintains that although it is judicially creative and institutionally self-serving in certain aspects, the doctrine is an invaluable guarantee against constitutional authoritarianism. The paper finally gives the recommendations regarding a more orderly and open constitutional dialogue between the Parliament and the Supreme Court.